Charles A. Dice Center for Research in Financial Economics
Former CEO Directors: Lingering CEOs or Valuable Resources?
Rüdiger Fahlenbrach, Bernadette A. Minton, and Carrie H. Pan
ABSTRACT
A firm is more likely to reappoint a former CEO to its board of directors after retirement the better is the firm's market-adjusted stock performance, the longer is the CEO's tenure, if the CEO is a founder of the firm, and the more inexperienced is the successor CEO. Firms with former CEO directors make different corporate decisions. The relative performance-turnover sensitivity of the successor CEO is higher when the former CEO is a director. There is some evidence of more continuity of corporate policies and better performance when former CEOs are directors. After extremely poor firm performance under their successors, former CEOs often return to the CEO position. When they do so, their firms do as well as industry and past performance matched firms.
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