Charles A. Dice Center for Research in Financial Economics
Tomas Jandik and Anil K. Makhija
ABSTRACT
Despite SEC and state-level resistance, and contrary to the trend pursued by
other firms, many electric utilities have diversified into non-electric and
unregulated businesses. Moreover, this failure to focus has been rewarded with
higher firm values, again contrary to the discounts documented in the literature
for other diversifying firms. Prior literature has questioned whether these
premiums (or discounts) can be attributed to diversification per se.
Rather, these premiums could arise from the characteristics of the diversifying
firms, which have then endogenously chosen to diversify. In a new approach,
where regulation can make the diversification decision largely exogenous, we
examine the investment policies of the comparable electric-segments in the
diversifying and non-diversifying utilities. We find that single-segment
electric utilities over-invest compared to diversifying utilities, which
explains their diversification premiums and implies that diversification can
create value by opening up new investment opportunities.
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